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The dependence of one agent's actions upon thdselof 
constitutes a fundamental departure point for much of rJceived 
economic theory. Apart from a deterministic setting thJ p�esed8�1 of 
uncertainty implies a dependence on the probable actionJ o 
her 
agents; that is, the ultimate behavior of an individual l is 
certain extent a consequence of his beliefs concerning th 
I 
of other agents. While the difficulty associated with foTlmnl:.fii �' 
even crude conjectures of this nature is overwhelming, lcdual 
informational demands are even greater as from the depeldence 
agent A's actions on his beliefs concerning agent B's aht�ons, 
follows directly that agent B's actions are dependent oh His 
I 
concerning agent A's beliefs relative to his (agent B's� 
I 
well, ad infinitum. Consider the following quote from Ke -
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• . .  professional investment may be likened to those newspaper 
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six 
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to 
the average preferences of'the competitors as a whole; so that 
each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself 
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch 
the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at 
the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of 
choosing those which to the best of one's judgment, are really 
the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely 
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we 
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion 
expects the average opinion to be. .And there are some, I believe, 
who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. 
The above passage indicates that economic decision making in an uncertain 
* 
setting may entail assessments of what average opinion may be. The 
classical method of circumventing the problem is to eliminate deviations 
between individual and average beliefs by positing identical subjective 
beliefs or "homogeneous expectations •. " In a static setting this may 
be an appropriate resolution but when dynamic considerations are 
introduced it becomes necessary to go one step further. The fundamental 
problem is that current period actions, while not affecting current 
period outcomes, may often affect future outcomes; e. g. , when an 
individual purchases a security he is concerned not only with dividend 
income, but also with potential capital gains (losses). While dividends 
* 
The consequences of this issue have not been devoid of discussion 
in the literature as exemplified by the distinction drawn by Starr (15] 
concerning ex ante and� post Pareto optimality. 
this period are independent of the expectations of other tnv 
· d · · d d h I. next perio security prices are epen ent on sue expectatio 
concommitant market transactions. I� ithis context the avdid 
ex ante mistakes requires, in terms of the above quote frdm 
the ability to correctly engage in subsequent rounds of alti 
"what average opinion thinks average opinion to be. " While 
a phenomena which plagues many equilibrium concepts, we e�l 
implications in the context of the theory of corporate fiJan 
stockmarket equilibrium. 
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I. MOD IG LIANI AND MILLE R  
The classic paper in the economics of corporate finance is of 
course the first Modigliani and Miller paper, "The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment" [10]. This paper argues 
that the market value of any firm is determined by the "risk class" to 
which the firm belongs, and is independent of the debt-equity ratio of 
the firm. 
The notion of a risk class of firms is central to the MM 
argument and may be defined as follows. Let Xie denote the earnings 
of firm i in state of nature e. E ach investor has a subjective 
probability distribution over e. Firms i and j belong to the same 
risk class for a given investor if their earnings are perfectly 
correlated over states of nature so that 
X
ie aij xje 
for all e, 
where a .. is a constant independent of e·. 1.J 
The MM paper is a little vague as to just what is assumed 
concerning the agreement of beliefs among investors. We will adopt 
the strongest of assumptions in order to highlight the difficulties 
that arise under even this case. So we postulate that investors 
are in unanimous agreement as to the subjective probability 
distribution over e and as to the earnings of each firm in each 
state of nature e. It follows that every investor agrees as to 
the identity of the firms in any risk class k. 
MM assume that bonds are default risk free and tlhat 
individual investors can borrow or lend at the risk frej itteres 
rate that applies to corporate bond�. Then the basic � p opos�ti�on 
is the following. 
MM Proposition. The market value 
capital structure and is given by 
of any firm is indeperide 
capitalizing its expedte
the rate pk appropriate to its class. 
t of 
Let xj denote the expected earnings of firm j Ian� letJ denote the market value of firm j. M. = p. E .  + D ., where . is1 J J J J J 
the price per share of firm j's stock, E .  is the number lof sha J 
of firm j's stock outstanding, and D .  is the face value J 
issued by firm j. 
The MM Proposition asserts that 
Mj 
p.E . + D .  J J J 
xj/pk 
for any firm j belonging in risk class k. 
s 
at 
The argument to establish this proposition is 
Suppose firms 1 and 2 are in the same risk class and, for 
1e fol�rng. 
•imp��i<y, 
assume each has the same earnings stream (a12 
= a21
= 1), 
the same expected return X. Suppose firm 1 is financed l e  
d hen 
I 
tire 
the 
by 
stock while firm 2 has bonds in its capital structure . . 1M� = p1r�llis 
the value of firm 1 and M2 
= p2E2 + D 2 is the value of firm 12. �:mwose 
Mz > Ml. 
Consider an investor holding s2 shares 
a percent of the outstanding shares (s2 aE 2). 
from his holdings in state of nature e. Then 
of firm 
Let Y2b 
enting rep 
I enot ncome 
6 
Yze = a(Xze - rD2) 
where r is the interest rate. But, by assumption x2e x1e for every 
e, hence let Xe = Xle = Xze so that 
y2e a (xe - rD2). 
Suppose the investor sells his shares in firm 2 and borrows 
aD2 dollars to invest the proceeds in the shares of firm 
1. Let s1 
denote his new holdings of firm l's stock. Then 
Yle' where 
plSl a (p2E 2 + D2). 
Income from this new portfolio in state e is denoted by 
sl Yle = � Xe - arD2 1 
- <lM2 -····X plE l 
e arD2 a(� Xe - rD2) • 
with M2 > � (and with Xe> O) , then tie> Y2e, hence_each investor 
will find it profitable to sell shares of firm 2 and acquire shares 
of firm 1, until M2 = �· A similar argument applies if M1 > M2 • 
There are several problems with this argument, all well 
known. First, if there is default risk then in general, the MM 
proposition fails. This relies on the work of Smith [13] and 
Stiglitz [16]. Second, if the borrowing (or lending) rate of 
.,, 
the investor differs from that for any firm, then general�y 
fails. Again see Stiglitz [16], who regards this as perhlp 
restrictive condition of the MM propd�ition. Finally, thb 
is generally invalid when capital gains are taken into acbo 
,..JL 
the llilitlst 
want to expand on this last point. 
The MM argument implicitly assumes that investors 
concerned only with income from their portfolios and are no 
concerned about the market values of the stocks and bonds1 t 
Once wealth as well as income becomes a matter of interest 
investor, the riskless arbitrage argument fails. Specif�ca 
our investor holds s2 shares of firm 2, M2 > � and the il� 
rgu 
t. 
are 
ey h 
or t 
ly, I 
stor 
believes xl = x2 X and that firms 1 and 2 are in the sdme risW 
H e  knows that by transferring into firm l's stock he can lraise 
income in every state of nature, just as in the MM situatiio 
Furthermore, suppose every investor has the same beliefs. oes 
guarantee a shift out of firm 2's stock into firm l's stJck? 
Unfortunately there is no such guarantee and tJe 
I 
pose 
ass. 
s 
s 
ed that identified by Keynes. Just because I think firm 2 is ve�� is no guarantee that everyone else thinks it is overvaluJd. Fro� 
point of view of an individual �nvestor it is clearly coJce·vabJ� 
everyone else in the market regards firms 1 and 2 as beiJg ·n dJ ,�I , 
risk classes, and that the overvalued firm is 1 rather Jh 2. I
this were the case, then it would still make sense from Jhe poin ·lfof 
view of income to buy firm 1, but not from the point of li 
he 
hat 
rent 
of 
contemplated capital gains. So far as we can see, there I isl no w. 
·de Ill to eliminate this problem -- the market simply does not pr 
8 
investor assurance that his perception of risk classes is that 
which everyone else perceives. M oreover, things are worse than 
this, since even if everyone agrees, everyone must know that everyone 
agrees, and so forth, if truly riskless arbitrage is to occur. 
The same problem arises in the homemade leverage 
literature; we present a somewhat more formal statement of the 
difficulty. 
II. THE HOM EMADE L EVERAGE THEO REM 
the approach in Smit� [ 
�'nd/or modifications bf
approach in the existing literature. 1 There is a single Ja.r
G enerally, we will follow 
but we note various generalizations 
issues bonds and stocks, and we examine the decision probl e 
typical investor. We use the notation: 
e earnings per dollar of assets of the f�rm 
r contractual interest rate on bonds 
D number of $1 bonds issued by the firm 
E number of shares issued by the firm 
fl 
I i 
9 
3, 1 
his 
whi1· 
of 
p price per share at the beginning of th� period 
M = p E + D  
0 
_p__ = µ = 
p E 
0 
s 
B 
Wo 
w 
P1 
While 
in the interest 
ongoing entity. 
capitalization of the firm 
debt-equity ratio of the firm 
number of shares purchased by the inve1to 
number of bonds purchased by the investor 
initial wealth of the investor 
wealth of the investor at the end of tHe 
prioe per •hare ac Che �d of Che periid· 
we adopt a one period planning horizon fir 
of notational simplicity, the firm is ass 
This is in contrast to the Smith [13] ajd 
erio 
he i 
d to 
tigl 
stor 
an 
[16] 
10 
* 
papers, where it is implicitly assumed that liquidation takes place 
at the end of the single period. 
We assume there is no default risk, again for notational 
simplicity and to highlight the
.
special problems associated with 
capital gains. Thus the bonds of the firm pay guaranteed interest 
and so the investor holds no cash in his portfolio. 
The basic budget constraint is then 
Wo B + Po S, 
and wealth at the end of the period is given by 
s W = (l+r) B + [6(D+po E) - rD]E + p1S. 
The first term on the RHS of (2) is the value of the 
investor's holdings of bonds at the end of the period. The second 
term identifies the investor's share of equity earnings during the 
(1) 
(2) 
period, assumed to be paid out in the form of dividends at the end 
of the period, and the final term is the market value of the investor's 
shares at the end of the period. Rewriting (2) we have 
W = (l+r) B + [6(1+µ) -•rµ]p0S + p1S. (3) 
* 
In Stiglitz [17] a state preference dynamic programming approach 
is used. Stock prices are deterministic and bond prices are random 
until maturity date when bonds are paid off in full. There is zero 
default probability and complete agreement of expectations on this. 
Where µ = D /E. In contrast to Smith and Stiglitz, there are! two 
random variables, 8 and p1, with joint p. d. f. f (6, p1) .
The investor chooses S and � to maximize expectJd 
of terminal wealth W subject to the bfildget constraint. Llt tilil delrue 
expected utility, where 
we have 
ratio µ: 
av '"§S = Apo . 
EU(W) V = fJ00 U(W) f(8, p1) d8dp1• 
0 -00 
Let L V + A[W0 - B - p0S]. Then at an interior xim 
aL 
aB = (l+r) EU'(W) - A 0 
aL = E{U' (W) [ (8 (1 + µ) - rµ) po +Pl]} - Apo as 
aL 
af. = Wo - B - Po S 0 
0 
Consider the effect on V of a change in the firm's deb 
dv = av + av dB + av dSdµ aµ aB dµ as dµ • 
dB dS . From (3), dµ = -p0 dµ , while from (1) and 
dV - av Hence, dµ aµ ' an instance of the usual 
av (2) ' 9B I= A, 
 
envelLo-de th 
1) 
2) 
3) 
quity 
em. 
Specifically, 
av = E{U' (W) (8 - r) }p0S+l00f00 U(W) �f dp1d8, as 
. . 0 -00 µ 
taking as our general case that µ is a parameter of f(8, p1) .
12 
In the special case examined by Smith and Stiglitz, p1 = Po 
(it is known with certainty that the terminal market price per share 
is p0) , and f = 0. Thus �V = EU' (W) (8 - r) p0S, while from (2) µ aµ 
Thus 
aL 
= EU'(W) {(8(1+µ) - rµ+l]po } - APo = 0 as 
EU'(W) {(8 - r) (l+µ) + (l+r) } = A. . 
But from (1) , (l+r) EU'(W) A. so that 
EU'(W) {(8 - r) }  O, dV hence
.dµ 
The assumptions that p1 = 'po and fµ 
o. 
0 thus lead to the 
homemade leverage theorem. That is, assuming B > 0, changes in the 
debt-equity ratio of the firm have no effect on the expected utility 
of the investor; any changes in the firm's leverage position can be 
exactly offset by anti-leveraging (to use Smith's term) on the part 
of the investor. In particular, assumin g a regular constrained 
interior maximum, it can be shown (see Smith [13]) that 
dS 
= _ _ 
S_ dB = � dµ l+µ ' dµ l+µ . 
Hence, 
dW dB dS 
dµ = (l+r) dµ + [8(l+r) - rµ+.,J..]p0dµ + p0S[8 - r] O, 
so that terminal wealth W is independent of the debt-equit 
Needless to say, the assumptions that p1 = Po � 
are not trivial restrictions on the problem. It is true 
rat:ii 
f J 
t 
µ 
t�j� 1 1one 
e fi l!M at 
the end of the period formally bypass issues associated wi h r�bdmness 
of p1; and if p1 is not a random variable so that f = f (�) the�k llis 
no reason to assume f 1' 0. Once one drops the one perild mode� llitlf 
period Smith and Stiglitz models based on liquidation of 
the firm, it is just �at possible to avoid the problems ls ocia� 
with the resale market for the firm's stock, and generally ther�lrnms 
d · · b b·1· d. ·b · d e � a non egenerate J oint pro a l. ity istri ution over p1 an • .ll 
joint distribution f(p1, 8) satisfies f = 0 only under shr ngen� 
aomm>p<Lms concerofog auHudos of in:"""· SaCiofylg fµ 1 1 
amounts to saying that the investor assumes that in the lg regat l, 
other in vestors will ignore the firm's debt-equity ratio · arrl�ng 
at their portfolio choices. As contrasted with the one pe iod �!!I'd.el 
where the homemade leverage theorem holds, now any indiv�d al ��estor 
has to concern himself not only with the relatively "obj�cttive" 
analysis of the earning potential of a firm but also with he "�1�jective" 
analysis of the attitudes and beliefs of other investors, s th��lare 
rnflec«d in Che <es<U.e =rke< for <he "ock of che fi�. The �··blem 
Thel f ct t��t all seems to be in part one of information transmitted. 
orher inve•<or• will i,.,ore <he debr-eqoiry rario in ••k\'n$ porl••1io 
eflecl!Js the choices, even if true, does not imply that fµ = 0 since If 
14 
beliefs of the given investor, not objective reality. 
When fµ � 0 and f(p1, 8) is nondegenerate, then generally the 
homemade leverage theorem fails.· To see this note that when p1 is
random, (2) can be rewritten as 
EU'(W) {(8 - r) (l+µ) p0 + (l+r) po + {p1 - po ) }= APo • 
so that 
Since 
dV = dµ 
EU' (W) {8 - r} EU' (W) {po - pl}/po (l+µ) . 
EU' {W) (8 - r) p0S +[00 r :(W)fµdp1d8, 0 J_oo 
�� = 0 if and only if
I""l"" [U'(W) (po - Pl) + U(W) fµp0.(l+µ) ]dp1d8 0 -oo o. 
Note that even when f µ O, :� = 0 only if EU' (W) (po - pl) = 0.
One way of interpreting this is to say that in the face of 
a change in the firm's debt-equity po�ition, the investor is not able 
to engage in the appropriate offsetting anti-levaraging in a 
completely risk free manner; arguments based on riskless arbitrage 
fail. 
l.' 
III. STOCKHOLDER UNANIMITY 
We next consider the question of whether there �s some 
 unambiguous measure of "the interests"of the stockholders"! fer a 
firm operating in a world of uncertaiQ.ty. The "stockholder nani��y" 
literature (Diamond [3], Leland [8], Ekern and Wilson [4], a d  I 
Forsythe [ 6]) asserts that under certain conditions such an namblffilff1ous 
measure exists. However, once again, the basic propositiJns thati l l1fil,.ve 
been derive rest upon the assumption that the firm will bl l" quiJlil!i:ed 
at the end of the period. 
Adopting the notation of the previous section, don�ider 
world in which there are N + 1 firms, each financed solel), trroug 
stock (as is pointed out in the existing literature, this lis not I� 
substantive restriction so far as unanimity results
.
are clncerned 
Firm j, j = O, •.. , N + 1, has a profit function n3 (dj , z) w)lere 
is a decision variable for firm j, and z is a random variable. 
Let sj number of shares of stock in firm j 
s� shares of firm j owned by investor i 
l. 
;j initial price per share of firm j 
�j 0 .initial market value of firm j, where VJ 
pj end of period price per share of firm j 
vj end of period value of firm.j (Vj = pjSj) 
End of period wealth for consumer i, Wi, is given by 
w. 
l. 
N . 
l: s� <� + pj) ,
j=O i sJ 
pj�j 
16 
that is, end of period wealth for consumer i equals earnings from 
his portfolio plus the end of period market value of the portfolio. 
Then consumer i chooses S. 
1 
E Ui (Wi) subject to
N o. • • 
E p3 cs� - s�) 
j=O i i 
- (S�, 
0, 
S N) . . . , i to maximize 
where s� is the initial endowment of shares of firm j held by consumer 
1 
i. 
A financial equilibrium is then defined as a matrix of 
stock holdings [S�] i = 1, • • • , M, j = O, • • .  , N for a given decision 
1 
vector d = (do, dN) such that 
(i) 
(ii) 
s. = cs9' . . . ' S�) maximizes E U. (W.) subject to 
1 1 1 1 1 
N o. • 
E PJ (SJ -
-j 
j=O i 
Si) 
M . 
E A
] 
s. 
i=l 1 
s
j 
O; and 
j O, • • •  , N. 
The·maximization problem for consumer i can be formulated 
in terms of the Lagrangian 
N o. • • 
- J J -J L. E U. (W.) +A. [ E p (S. - S.)] i i i i j=O i i 
with first order conditions 
j . 
E U! (W.){�+ p3} i i sJ 
A.;
j 
1 
0 j 0, • • •  , N 
N o. • • 
E PJ cs� - S�) 
j=O i i 
o. 
Alternatively, from the budget constraint, 
with 
wi 
l N0 • • No .. sq = -( E p3s� - E p3S�) i pO j=O i j=l i 
1TO N .� . 
s� Cgo + pO) + E s� (--;-+ PJ) . 
j=l i sJ 
oo 
(We will adopt the simplifying assumption that pO = p ; 
initial and end of period prices of security 0 
known with certainty). Then we have 
w. 1 
wi 
1TO l N o. . N . 1Tj . 
Co+ pO)o E p3s� + E s� {--;-+ p3 s p j=O i j=l i SJ 
nO 
<so + 
O+vO No .. N . i+V j f1T 0 ) E pJs� + E s� {(11 • )-f .. . . 1 V j=O 1 j=l 1 SJ 
H ence at a constrained maximum of expected u�ii+LY 
consumer i we have 
aw 
· · 
E U! (W.)---4::: E U! (W.) { (
ir3 "t: V J) i i as� i i sJ 
1 
j 1, . • •  , N. 
irO + vo);j} ( (\ s 
It might be well at this point to note that in 
literature it is usual to assume that end of period firm 
is, 
} ; 
for 
unanllfmity 
pjsj 
18 
are nonrandom; in fact they are taken as given constants (liquidation 
values) independent of such variables as dj, the jt:!.1 firm's decision 
variable. In the general case of course, p = (po, • • .  , pN) as well
as .1f = (1fO, • • .  , 1fN) are random'variables with joint distribution 
<f>i(p,z), (recall that� = �(dj, z) where z is a random variable) . 
Hence EU. = I f U.(W.) <j>i(p,z) dpdz. In general, 1. 1. 1. 
p z 
0 N d = (d ' • . •  'd ) is an argument of <Pi, that is, <Pi i <P (p, z; d) . 
To turn to the stockholder unanimity theorems, the idea 
behind such theorems is to identify conditions on the financial 
environment (preferences, endowments, etc. ) such that, for any firm 
j, all stockholders of j unanimously agree as to the desirability or 
lack of desirability of any change in firm j's decision variable dj. 
Hence all stockholders of firm j agree unanimously as to 
the optimal level at which dj should be set. When unanimity holds,
the rule for managing a firm under uncertainty becomes as unambiguous 
as the profit maximization rule that holds under certainty. 
Consider then the effect of a change in dj on the value of 
expected utility for consumer i: 
dEUi = 
ddj 
aw. N aw. as� 
EU!(W.) {� + E ��} 
1 1 ad3 j=l as� ad3 1. +f f  p z 
aw. f f  EU!(W.) � + a<1>i U. (W.) -. dpdz 
1 1 ad3 1 1 ad3 p z 
a<1>i U. (W.) -. dpdz 
1 1 ad3 
by the usual envelope theorem. · 
1fo Let r = vO so that 
Then 
No . . N .  �+ Vj o· w. = (r+l) E p3s� + Es�{( . - (r+l) p3}i. 
1 j=O 1 j=l 1 VJ 
aw. N o. . a N . Cl 
oj N . a 
oj o ·1 a -2:. = E p3sJ___!_ + (r+ 1) E s:!-L - E s� [ (r+ l) � + p3 -
Cldk j=O i adk j=O 1 adk j=l 1 adk ad 
Clr N o. . N 0 • • N . a 
0j 
= - {  E p3s� - E p3s�} + (r+l) { E s�.!1£:. 
adk j=O 1 j=l 1 j=O 1 3dk 
N 
E 
Take the special case where endowments are at 
equilibrium so that si = si for all i, j. Then we have
aw. " " o -2:. = s? [pO .£E... + (r + 1) _o_p_]. 
adk 1 adk adk 
We can now state an unanimity theorem: 
1 
anc 
Stockholder Unanimity Theorem: Assume that (1) profits for !firms 
other than k are independent of dk for k = 0, • • •  , N; (2) Ith� jo 
pdf <j>i(p, z; d) is independent of d; (3) initial endowmentslare at 
financial equilibrium. Then stockholders of firm k are urian�mous 
their evaluation of the optimum level of dk for k = 0, . .  1., 
�: 
dEUi = 
ddk 
aw. JJ EU:i_(Wi) Cld� ·� 
. ·. p z 
20 
2£ U. (W.) k dpdz.i i Cld 
By (2) , the expression under the integrals is zero, while by (1) and 
(3)' 
aw 2=so[o ar 
Cldk i 
P ak + (r + l)�] 
d (ld
k 
• 
Clearly the expression inside the brackets is independent of i, hence 
with U� > 0 for every i, 
i 
. dEUi . dEUt sign -- = sign --
ddk ddk 
for any i, t such that 8i > o, s� > o. The optimal level of dk is then
such that 
a · o 
pO....!.... + (r + l)� = O, 
Cldk Cld
k 
identical for all stockholders. 
A more sophisticated version of the stockholder unanimity 
theorem appears in Eckern and Wilson, and in Forsythe. In those two 
papers, an Arrow-Debreu formulation of uncertainty in terms of states 
of the world is presented. Buying a share of firm j then is equivalent 
to buying a contingent claim contract with known payoffs (depending 
on dj) for each possible state of the world. Then "there will be 
' 
I 
'I stockholder unanimity with respect to the actions of an ind:i.lviduci\l�llfirm, 
independent of investors' subjective probability distribubions 
utility functions, if any proposed c�hnge in the firm's sba -dis!i!!ll:libu­
tion of returns does not alter the se� of state-distributlo of J�uurns 
available to each individual in the economy" (Forsythe, p l ) • J.ffllJs 
more complicated "spanning condition" replaces condition l3) abojml� no 
longer is it necessary that initial endowments be equilibtit end&'l-Jments. 
However, conditions (1) and (2) still stand; in particulat, sens���vity 
 .!ili'l of oap<<al gain• '' f<� de<J.s<�• generally oa�e• probli 
stockholder unanimity results. 
e 
Once again the basic problem is that of insulatin 
investor from the market. When the Eckern-Wilson "spannilg jcondi!'lllilon" 
holds (and if future prices of stocks are independent of k) the�llillhere 
is riskless arbitrage possible to permit investors to offletj any ll��oposed 
changes by firm managers. But the riskless arbitrage is ln�y po ble 
if changes in firm decision variables leave �� = 0 where
�� = £ [ � U.(W.) k(p,z;d)dpdz.i i Cld 
In other words, when changes in decision variables (e.g.r ratio of a firm or some other decision variable) have nontr 
on the probability distribution over end of period prices
there is no way to offset this in a completely risk free I
portfolio choices. 
he d /equity 
vial acts 
ener .y 
.ner 
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